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The Troubled Tower 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Buildings are constructed for certain purposes, and the buildings of today are more practical, 
from the standpoint of the man who is in them than the older buildings. […] We are considering effort and 
convenience much more than appearance or effect. 
-Raymond Hood, architect of Rockefeller Center 
Roark looked across the river at the shell of the unfinished building on an unusually cold April morning in 
Metropolis. The building, originally designed to be the signature property of an elite hotel company, sat 
partially finished on the south bank of the Metropolis River. As Roark looked at the building, questions 
raced through his mind: Was the unfinished building an opportunity or just a waiting nightmare? If his 
company purchased the building, how should it be completed and as what? 
Keywords 
Cornell, real estate, related, related group, metropolis, hotel, retail, condominium, columns, chicago, 
abandoned, construction loan, default, distressed, opportunistic, opportunity fund, bank, tower, 
construction, renovation, finish 
This article is available in Cornell Real Estate Review: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/crer/vol13/iss1/13 
Cornell Real Estate REview
130
A native of Deckerville, Michigan, 
Jason Spencer graduated from 
the College of Engineering at 
the University of Michigan, 
with a Bachelors of Science in 
Civil Engineering in 2006 and 
a Masters of Engineering in 
Structural Engineering in 2007.  
Upon graduation, Jason joined 
the international structural 
engineering firm of Thornton 
Tomasetti (TT) in Washington, DC.  
TT provides engineering design, 
investigation, and analysis services 
to clients worldwide on projects of 
every size and level of complexity. 
At TT, Jason worked on numerous 
commercial and institutional 
projects from conception through 
construction.  After leaving 
TT, Jason worked at regional 
structural engineering firms in 
Chicago, IL and Denver, CO. 
Jason is a licensed professional 
engineer and a Leadership in 
Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) accredited professional 
for New Construction and Major 
Renovations. Upon completion 
of Cornell’s MPS in Real Estate, 
Jason intends to pursue a career 
in development that successfully 
balances economic constraints, 
architectural aesthetics, and 
sustainable design principles.
Author
By: Jason L. Spencer
Buildings are constructed for certain purposes, and the buildings of today are more practical, from the standpoint of the man who is in them than the older buildings. […] We are considering effort and 
convenience much more than appearance or effect.
-Raymond Hood, architect of Rockefeller Center
Roark looked across the river at the shell of the unfinished building on an unusually cold 
April morning in Metropolis. The building, originally designed to be the signature property 
of an elite hotel company, sat partially finished on the south bank of the Metropolis River. 
As Roark looked at the building, questions raced through his mind: Was the unfinished 
building an opportunity or just a waiting nightmare? If his company purchased the building, 
how should it be completed and as what?
South River Tower
Clark Street Development Group (CSDG) came up with the idea for South River Tower 
in 2005, just as new construction starts in Metropolis, and across the country, reached record 
highs. CSDG had a track record of developing office buildings throughout the region, 
but was looking to get into hospitality and mixed-use development sectors. As such, the 
company sought to build a tower that would have approximately two hundred luxury 
hotel rooms on the lower levels and two hundred luxury condos on the upper floors. 
The building site was located along the Metropolis River, one block from a busy subway 
station, five blocks from a premier retail street, and six blocks from a large public park. 
CSDG wanted to design a building that would redefine the Metropolis skyline. 
CSDG hired Hancock Tooth Architects to be the lead architect on the project. Since 
South River Tower was going to be such a departure from the company’s previous projects, 
CSDG wanted to work with an architect that it had previously worked with. Like CSDG, 
Hancock Tooth had extensive experience designing office buildings throughout the region, 
but had designed only a few hospitality projects. To reduce the project’s upfront costs, 
CSDG offered Hancock Tooth a 2% equity share and the ability to have full aesthetic design 
control of the building instead of the traditional 7% design fee.
Hancock Tooth was enticed by this unusual opportunity and designed a trophy-worthy, 
1.6M square foot (SF); 95-story building that had an intricate glass and stone facade. High-
end finishes were specified throughout the building.  
The first two levels of the building were designed to have great street visibility and 
would be occupied by high-end retail stores. Levels three through twenty-five would be 
parking, and levels twenty-six through ninety-five would house the hotel/residential 
tower. Levels twenty-six and twenty-seven would house the hotel’s amenity spaces. Levels 
twenty-eight and fifty-nine housed mechanical equipment that was needed to service the 
rest of the hotel tower (Exhibit 1).
Hancock Tooth, in conjunction with the structural engineer, sought to save costs by 
using an efficient reinforced concrete structural system, in which the columns would be 
spaced at 20’-0” on center in both directions (Exhibit 4). This relatively small spacing would 
allow the columns to be placed inside the demising walls between units. Twenty-inch 
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thick concrete core walls would surround the elevator and stair shafts and resist the forces 
imposed by the strong Metropolis winds.
CSDG hired Jackson Lee Construction as the general contractor. Like Hancock Tooth, 
CSDG got Jackson Lee involved in the project early, during the schematic design phase. 
Throughout the design process, CSDG continued to have Jackson Lee review the progress 
drawings to better understand the project’s costs and to identify possible value engineering 
opportunities. Despite following this approach, the total costs, per square foot, for the 
project were $275 for the retail levels, $200 for the parking levels, and $375 for the hotel/
residential levels. Using these numbers, Jackson Lee estimated that the project’s total hard 
costs would be $515M and construction would last twenty-seven months once ground was 
broken.
Construction Stops
CSDG wanted to start construction on South River Tower as soon as possible. To 
accomplish this, the company funded the excavation and foundation costs using $30M of 
its own equity and took out a $40M one-year bridge loan from Bank A. CSDG anticipated 
that these funds would finance the first year of construction. Meanwhile, the company 
would look for a permanent construction loan to finance the remaining construction costs.
In the spring of 2007, when site excavation began, tower cranes were everywhere in 
Metropolis and it looked like South River Tower would be a great success. By the fall of 
2007, foundation construction was complete and the building was beginning to go vertical. 
Building activity in the city was still strong, but lenders were getting nervous about all 
of the new supply coming on line and started to raise lending rates, especially for new 
construction loans. At this point, the original $60M that had been invested in the project 
had almost been exhausted and CSDG still had not secured a permanent construction loan. 
The company had talked to several lenders, but the higher rates and lower loan-to-value 
ratios that were being offered significantly decreased the project’s anticipated return. CSDG 
believed that the market would improve shortly and invested an additional $10M of equity 
into the project while it kept looking for more favorable lending terms.
Construction crews built about one story per week and by the fall of 2008 the building 
was twenty-one stories tall.  While the building was going up rapidly, the economy was 
shrinking and the demand for luxury hotel rooms and residential units was shrinking 
exponentially. By this point, CSDG had already invested $30M into the project and the 
bridge loan had been completely exhausted and was coming due in less than six weeks. 
Construction loan terms had not improved and several of the loan offers made earlier in 
the year had been rescinded. 
By early October, Jackson Lee was not getting paid on time. A year earlier, when new 
construction projects were plentiful, the contractor would have abandoned the project, but 
by this point, there was not another project to go to. As such, Jackson Lee agreed to continue 
building with the hope that the economy would improve and CSDG would be able to get 
a construction loan.
By January of 2009, it became apparent that CSDG would not be able to get a 
construction loan. The building was twenty-five stories tall, but Jackson Lee had not been 
paid since early October and was owed approximately $15M. The pace of construction 
declined dramatically and several sub-contractors walked off of the project due to lack of 
payment. Bank A was also demanding repayment of the one year bridge loan the bank had 
made to get construction started and was threatening to file suit against CSDG. 
In February of 2009, CSDG suspended construction; however, it was more of a 
formality as little progress had been made since the first of the year. As soon as construction 
stopped, the tower crane came down and the building was abandoned, fully exposed to the 
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elements.  The general contractor and several sub-contractors filed mechanics liens against 
the building. Bank A also filed suit against CSDG for its failure to repay the bridge loan.
New Ownership
After construction stopped, CSDG looked everywhere for additional sources of 
financing, but the national economy was in terrible shape and no one was willing to take 
a risk on the project. Desperate and out of options, CSDG agreed to turn the project over 
to the contractors and lender in February of 2009 to resolve the unpaid bridge loan and 
mechanics liens that had been filed against the building.1
Bank A and Jackson Lee did not know what to do with the building: the national economy 
was extremely weak and the hotel company that the building was originally designed for 
backed out of the project. Bank A did not want to be in the development business and was 
unwilling to put any more money into the project. Jackson Lee was looking for work, but 
like Bank A, did not have any development experience or the financial resources to restart 
the project. After a few months, it became apparent that Bank A and Jackson Lee would 
have to find an experienced developer to partner up with and finish the building or sell the 
site as is. The uneasy ownership group began making calls to gauge potential interest in 
both options.
Port City was initially contacted about the project in the summer of 2009, but was 
apprehensive about getting involved in the project. The national and local economies had 
stabilized, but vacancies were elevated all across Metropolis while rents were significantly 
lower than what they had been in 2007. Due to its good location, Port City was interested 
in acquiring the site outright, but Bank A and Jackson Lee rejected the company’s offer and 
instead proposed forming a joint venture to finish the building. Port City did not have an 
existing relationship with Bank A nor Jackson Lee and was nervous about undertaking 
such a risky project with an unfamiliar team. In the end Roark and Port City decided that 
finishing South River Tower was too risky.
The building sat abandoned for two more years – a symbol of the 2008 financial 
meltdown. The concrete shell had become an eyesore and the city was eager to see the 
project completed or demolished. Fearing a city takeover of the project, Bank A and Jackson 
Lee were motivated to get whatever value they could out of the unfinished building. Once 
again, they contacted Roark and Port City in regards to the project.
Port City
Port City is a large developer that is focused on developing new office and multi-family 
properties in the United States. The company started in New York City in the late 1960s and 
grew into one of the largest privately held real estate companies in the United States. The 
company now has offices in several U.S. cities including Metropolis, Chicago, and New 
York.
Unlike other multi-city real estate companies, the different offices have limited 
interaction and, in some ways, operate like separate franchises. Each office finds and 
manages its projects. 20% of each office’s yearly profits are set aside to pay for company-
wide expenses and to fund corporate growth initiatives.
In late 2008, Port City created an $800M opportunistic fund that was focused on 
acquiring distressed assets. The mission of the fund was to identify distressed residential 
projects in core markets that had stopped or been significantly scaled back due to the 
1 The ownership percentage of Bank A and Jackson Lee was divided based upon how much money each party was owed. As such, 74% of the 
property reverted to Bank A, while the remaining 26% reverted to Jackson Lee.
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recession. If these project presented an opportunity, the fund’s managers would consider 
investing anywhere between $25M and $75M in them in an effort to finish and stabilize 
them as soon as possible. When Bank A and Jackson Lee contacted Port City again in 2011, 
Roark thought about South River Tower’s superior location and started to think that this 
might be a perfect recovery fund investment opportunity. 
Market Analysis
Soon after beginning an in-depth analysis of the project, Port City concluded that there 
was not sufficient demand in Metropolis to support a 95-story luxury hotel/residential 
building. 
Spurred by recent laws passed by the city and state governments, the business 
environment had become friendlier in Metropolis and a few large corporations had recently 
relocated their headquarters to the city. As such, the office market had rebounded slightly, 
but there was still more than 1 million square feet of vacant space in the CBD. Class A rents 
in the immediate neighborhood of South River Tower were around $25/SF with $50/SF of 
tenant improvements and six months of free rent. 
Roark anticipated that, if the building was completed as an office building, it would 
take twenty-six months to complete construction. At project completion, Roark thought 
that the building would be at least 65% preleased and that the remainder of the space 
would be absorbed at 8% per year.
While the office market was relatively stagnant, the multi-family market was showing 
modest gains. During the 1990s, several multi-family buildings were built just north of the 
Metropolis River. These buildings were typically 30-40 stories in height and offered studio 
(approximately 550 SF), 1-bedroom (800 SF), and 2-bedroom apartments (1,100 SF); and 
rented for around $2.00 per SF per month. These buildings typically had modest amenities 
that included a fitness center, indoor pool, party room, and a sun deck.
Prior to the recession, most of these buildings’ residents were younger, transient 
millennials who would live downtown for a year or two before moving to one of 
Metropolis’s northern neighborhoods. As such, the market demand was much higher for 
smaller buildings in the area 1 – 2 miles north of downtown than it was for the immediate 
downtown area. Empty nesters were also beginning to move back into the CBD. However, 
architects and developers often struggled to design a building that would appeal to both 
millennials and empty nesters.
Roark thought that if he redesigned the building to have larger units and more luxurious 
amenities that he would be able to attract a diverse group of residents, achieve a higher 
level of occupancy and garner higher rents relative to the nearby residential buildings.
If the building were completed primarily as a for rent multi-family residential building, 
he thought that it would take twenty months to complete and that 70% of the apartments 
would be preleased prior to opening. After completing construction, Roark anticipated 
that it would take two years to get the building stabilized at an occupancy level of 95%. 
The rental market for luxury units in Metropolis had improved significantly and Roark 
anticipated that he would be able to rent the units for a minimum of $1700/month (Exhibit 3).
Design Concerns
The original 95-story structure was designed to be extremely robust; however, the floor 
plates and column layout were designed to accommodate usage as a hotel. Changing the 
building’s usage would require reconfiguring the floor plates and column layout.
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Finishing the project as an office would require eliminating all of the interior columns 
and the building’s interior core would have to be enlarged to accommodate additional 
elevators that would be required to service the increased occupant load. The capacity of the 
existing foundations would also have to be carefully examined. The initial design assumed 
that levels twenty-six through ninety-five would be eight inches thick and support a live 
load of 40 pounds per square foot (PSF). In order to eliminate the interior columns and 
support the required office live load of 90 PSF, the floor slabs would have to be thickened 
to eleven inches (Exhibit 5) . 
A preliminary structural engineering analysis indicated that the existing foundations 
could support a 45-story office building or a 60-story apartment building without the need 
for reinforcing the existing foundations. The existing foundations could be reinforced, but 
doing so would significantly increase construction costs.2
The existing structure’s condition was not completely known. From afar, the structure 
looked sound, but nothing had been done to weatherize the structure when it was 
abandoned in the winter of 2009. A closer inspection of the structure revealed that some 
of the concrete’s steel reinforcing bars were corroded and concrete was spalling off in 
localized areas (Exhibit 7). Further analysis would have to be undertaken to determine the 
extent of the damage and if the structure could be reused. This condition assessment would 
be estimated to cost at least $50,000.3
If Roark redesigned the building, should he retain Hancock Tooth as the architect or hire 
a new one? Going forward, Roark did not want the architect to have any equity participation 
in the deal, but he was not sure that Hancock Tooth would agree to this arrangement.  If a 
different architectural team redesigned the project, would the two phases of the redesigned 
building look coherent or would it look like two completely different buildings stacked on 
top of one another? 
Potential Deal
As Roark and Port City neared a decision as to whether or not to buy in to the project, 
old concerns rose again. In most distressed projects, the bank would have sold its interest 
to a different entity; however, Bank A wanted to remain in the deal and attempt to recoup 
some of its losses. Jackson Lee also wanted to recoup some of its losses and saw the project 
as a potential source of employment in a weak market.
 Roark was still concerned about the about the complicated structure of the proposed 
joint venture. Roark was also concerned, that Jackson Lee would try to make an exorbitant 
profit on the project. If Roark were to enter into a joint venture with Bank A and Jackson 
Lee, specific rules would have to be developed to detail each party’s role and participation 
(Exhibit 8).
Securing financing for the project would also be extremely difficult: Port City would 
contribute a maximum of $75M into the project from the recovery fund, but it was going 
to take substantially more money to complete the building. Unfortunately, other potential 
sources of additional financing were limited. The commercial mortgage-backed securities 
market was pretty much non-existent. Commercial banks were willing to make floating 
rate construction loans, but were hesitant to make loans that exceeded a 70% loan-to-value 
ratio and were demanding interest rates 750 basis points above the LIBOR rate floored at 
1%.4
Roark approached Bank A about taking a larger equity position in the project or loaning 
2 Each additional office floor above the 45th floor would require would require $900,000 in additional construction costs to strengthen the 
existing foundation system and building structure.
3 In the retail space, $75/SF would be required to repair the corrosion damage. $50/SF would be required to repair the corrosion damage done 
to the parking garage.
4 The 1-yr LIBOR rate in the summer of 2011 was 0.72%.
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money at favorable rates to Port City. Unfortunately, Bank A’s directors were hesitant to 
contribute any more money. Roark considered asking Port City’s board of directors for 
permission to invest more than $75M from the recovery fund to finance the project, but he 
was not sure that he would get approval to do so. 
Deal or No Deal
As Roark looked across the river, he knew that the abandoned tower presented a 
unique opportunity, if he could just find the right use for the site, make the numbers work, 
and navigate a complicated joint venture agreement with Bank A and Jackson Lee.
The preceding narrative is not intended to be representative of any one project but is derived 
from several projects that ran into financial trouble during the 2008 financial crisis.
Original Stacking Plan
Exhibit 1
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Exhibit 6: Turner Construction Building Cost Index for the First Quarter of 20125
5 ` Source: turnerconstruction.com
Initial Construction Costs
Exhibit 2
Potential Building Revenues as a 
95-story Residential Building
Exhibit 3
Original Column Layout
Exhibit 4
Top	  Floor
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  Floor
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Floor	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Built	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  SF
H
ard	  Cost	  ($/SF)
Forecasted	  H
ard	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  ($)
Total	  A
ctual	  Cost	  Incurred	  ($)
95
25
160
100
H
otel/Residential
70
16000
N
1,120,000
375.00
$420,000,000
$0
24
3
200
100
Parking
21
20000
Y
420,000
200.00
$84,000,000
$84,000,000
2
0
200
100
Retail
2
20000
Y
40,000
275.00
$11,000,000
$11,000,000
Total
1,580,000
$515,000,000
$95,000,000
Soft	  Cost	  (%
	  of	  forecasted	  hard	  costs)
11%
Total	  Soft	  Costs	  ($)
$56,650,000.00
Total	  Investm
ent	  at	  Foreclosure	  ($)
$151,650,000
Residential	  Revenue	  
Top	  Floor Bottom	  Floor Units/Floor Total	  Units Size/Apt Rent/Apt/Month Total	  Rent	  ($)
95 90 4 20 4000 $12,000 $240,000
89 85 4 16 4000 $10,000 $160,000
84 80 6 24 2667 $8,000 $192,000
79 75 6 24 2667 $6,500 $156,000
74 70 8 32 2000 $5,500 $176,000
69 65 8 32 2000 $5,000 $160,000
64 60 8 32 2000 $4,500 $144,000
59 55 8 32 2000 $4,000 $128,000
54 50 10 40 1600 $3,500 $140,000
49 45 10 40 1600 $3,000 $120,000
44 40 10 40 1600 $2,500 $100,000
39 35 14 56 1143 $2,000 $112,000
34 30 14 56 1143 $1,850 $103,600
29 25 14 56 1143 $1,700 $95,200
Total 320 500 $798,800 $2,026,800
Parking	  Revenue
Top	  Floor Bottom	  Floor Spots/Floor Total	  Spots Size	  Spot	  (SF) Rent/Space/Month Total	  Rent	  ($)
24 3 77 1617 180 $200.00 $323,400.00
General	  Vacancy	  (%) 15%
Effective	  Parking	  Rent	  ($) $274,890.00
Retail	  Revenue
Top	  Floor Bottom	  Floor Size	  (SF) Total	  Space	  (SF) Rent/SF/Year Rent/SF/Month Total	  Rent	  ($)
2 0 20000 40000 $250.00 $20.83 $833,333.33
General	  Vacany	  (%) 5%
Effective	  Retail	  Rent	  ($) $791,666.67
Total	  Effective	  Monthly	  Rent	  ($) $3,093,356.67
Total	  Effective	  Yearly	  Rent	  ($) $37,120,280.00
Notes:
2.)	  Market	  research	  indicates	  that	  the	  same	  total	  residential	  revenue	  could	  be	  generated	  by	  building	  a	  shorter
	  	  	  	  	  tower	  with	  fewer	  units	  and	  some	  of	  the	  amenity/mechanical	  space	  reloacted	  to	  the	  parking	  levels.
1.)	  As	  a	  95-­‐story	  building,	  every	  sixth	  floor	  would	  be	  required	  to	  house	  amenity	  or	  mechanical	  spaces.
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Revised Column Layout to 
Accommodate an Office Use
Exhibit 5
Turner Construction Building Cost 
Index for the First Quarter of 2012
Exhibit 6Turner Building Cost Index
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Exhibit 7: An example of the concrete deterioration that was typical on site6
6 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concrete_degradation
An example of the concrete 
deterioration that was typical 
on site
Exhibit 7
Proposed Joint Venture 
Participation
Exhibit 8
